


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


CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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6 November 1964

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

6 November 1964

DAILY BRIEF

*Bolivia: The situation appears to be stabilizing somewhat as Rene Barrientos, vice-president under Paz, takes power along with a military cabinet.

General Ovando, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, initially shared leadership with Barrientos, but promptly resigned for reasons that are as yet unclear. The cabinet members--all military officers--are of better than average quality, but their abilities are limited to military affairs.

Barrientos may be able to maintain a relatively stable government over the short run, but prospects for a protracted period of political peace are not good. Opposition against his government will develop rather quickly, and there is the possibility that a power struggle could develop within the ruling group. Barrientos currently enjoys widespread popular support, however, and the military appears to be backing him fully.

Juan Lechin, the former vice-president and leader of the National Leftist Revolutionary Party, has announced that he is satisfied with the new government and has called on his followers to respect law and order. This appears to be only a tactical maneuver on his part, and chances for leftist gains in the new government have not been eliminated.

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Czechoslovakia: Party first secretary Novotny will not attend the meeting of the bloc leaders in Moscow on 7 November, apparently as a demonstration of his independence.

Novotny's number-two man is leading the Czechoslovak delegation despite the fact that top leaders such as Gomulka, Kadar, Ulbricht, and Zhivkov will all attend the gathering. By not attending, Novotny is placing himself in much the same independent position as Rumanian party first secretary Gheorghiu-Dej, who also is not going to the meeting.

Prague has reacted coolly to the Soviet leadership change. Czechoslovakia has not even by implication joined in the criticism of Khrushchev and has continued to publish moderate praise of him. Perhaps in response to this attitude, Moscow so far as is known has not yet replied to the Czechoslovak regime's messages of congratulations to Brezhnev and Kosygin. All other Eastern European leaders have received such replies.

The Hungarian press has announced that Novotny would not go to Moscow, giving as the ostensible reason the presidential elections by the Czech parliament scheduled for 12 November.

Novotny's decision to absent himself from Moscow probably does not reflect any weakening of his leadership position. There are no signs of any shift in the power structure of the party.

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Congo: The Ugandan Government, possibly with Kenya's and Tanzania's approval, is facilitating arms deliveries by radical African states to the Congolese rebels.

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On 31 October an Algerian-owned IL-18 unloaded small crates at Arua in Uganda near the Congo border. [redacted] three Ugandan trucks then transported the crates into a part of the Congo occupied by rebels.

The East African governments may have decided to support the rebels last month when rebel representatives were meeting frequently with Ugandan, Kenyan, and Tanzanian officials. This specific shipment could have been arranged on 22 October when rebel "foreign minister" Kanza was in the Ugandan capital at the same time as Kenyan Minister of State Murumbi and the Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity. Two days earlier Kanza had visited Arua in the company of a Ugandan cabinet member.

Arms shipments such as this one probably will not be enough to shore up the Congolese rebel regime, whose military position is deteriorating rapidly.

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DAILY BRIEF

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
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LAOS



France--Common Market: [EEC president Hallstein's top aide got the impression during his recent visit to Paris that the highest levels of the French Government remain concerned that De Gaulle may take some "unpredictable" action against the Common Market.]

[The aide, Karl-Heinz Narjes, has told the US Embassy in Paris that it was his belief, and that of the French officials he talked with, that a German refusal to settle the grain price problem by 15 December might very well provoke De Gaulle to break up the EEC.]

Narjes, however, thinks the French would be satisfied with a German agreement to negotiate a "hypothetical" grain price if Bonn is willing to make a more definite commitment by mid-December. He indicated that the French are prepared to be flexible on the question of compensating German farmers.]

[According to a Bonn Foreign Ministry official, the grain price issue will probably come to a head at the 11-13 November EEC Council meeting. The Bonn government has shown no signs of backing down, but the official professed some optimism that a solution might be reached by the end of the year. He said, however, "only a miracle" would permit agreement before the Kennedy Round talks resume on 16 November.]

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NOTES

Laos: The Pathet Lao are beginning to show stiffer resistance to rightist military initiatives. South of Xieng Khouang Town, reinforced Communist forces have stalled a government advance northward from positions at Tha Thom and Ban Ta Viang. Farther south, right-wing forces east of Savannakhet have been turned back in their efforts to clear the Pathet Lao from the Ban Nong Boua Lao area.

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[redacted] (Map) [redacted]

Sudan: Various elements represented in the transitional coalition government continue to maneuver for influence. One Communist is among those dropped from immediate consideration for cabinet membership. (Most ^{many} army leaders are ^{now} giving at least tacit support to the civilian government, although

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[redacted] The government has not yet announced whether it will reinstate the suspended US overflight privileges, nor has it made any other major decisions.

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Yemen: Royalists and republican Yemeni representatives meeting in Sudan have reportedly reached agreement on a cease-fire to take effect on 8 November. A further meeting is scheduled for 23 November concerning a political settlement. Given the wide differences between the two sides and their Egyptian and Saudi backers on this subject and on Egyptian troop withdrawal, these discussions may well bog down.

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